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What is principled humanitarian action? What are its main activities?
Principled humanitarian action is generally defined in relation to the principles of inde-
pendence, impartiality (consideration only of need, without discrimination), neutrality 
(not taking sides), and humanity (the alleviation and prevention of human suffering). The 
term “principled” is used to distinguish humanitarian action that is instructed by those 
values from action that is not. For example, an actor who provides food and shelter in 
order to support one party militarily over another in an armed conflict would not qualify as 
“principled humanitarian action.”
The main intended beneficiaries of principled humanitarian action are civilians, as well as 
(other) people not or no longer participating in hostilities. Its primary activity is the provision 
of medical care, food, water, and other supplies indispensable for survival. In pursuing that 
goal, actors engaged in principled humanitarian action may need to negotiate access to 
their intended beneficiaries and, in doing so, may be required by domestic or other (de 
facto) authorities (who, for instance, control territory where civilians are located) to pay a 
registration fee. Principled humanitarian action typically occurs in areas affected by armed 
conflict as defined in international humanitarian law (IHL), though it may also take place in 
relation to natural disasters or other forms of emergencies.
What Security Council-imposed sanctions regimes implicate humanitarian actors?
In recent decades, the United Nations Security Council has instituted an increasingly broad 
set of sanctions. The power to develop those sanctions derives from the authority granted 
in the UN Charter to the Security Council in matters of international peace and security. 
UN Security Council decisions are legally binding primarily on member states. As a matter 
of international law, those decisions are typically considered not to be capable in general 
of legally binding UN funds, agencies, and bodies;1 non-governmental organizations; 
or individuals. However, as a matter of policy, UN funds, agencies, and bodies consider 
themselves bound to comply with Security Council resolutions, where applicable.2 And, 
in order to carry out a particular decision of the Security Council, a member state may 
consider it necessary to implement domestic measures requiring that NGOs, individuals, 
and others act in conformity with the underlying obligation. Through that domesticization 
process, the sanctions regimes might become binding on humanitarian NGOs.
1.  UN Charter art. 25, 48.
2.  See, e.g., United Nations Development Program, Procurement Ethics, ContraCt and ProCurement (Jan. 31, 
2008), https://info.undp.org/global/popp/cap/pages/ethics.aspx.
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Some elements of principled humanitarian action could potentially be implicated by 
thirteen of the sanctions regimes established by the Security Council. These regimes cover 
certain actions related to: 
• The Democratic Republic of the Congo (Res. 1493 and subsequent resolutions);
• Côte d’Ivoire (Res. 1572 and subsequent resolutions);
• Sudan (Res. 1591 and subsequent resolutions);
• Lebanon (Res. 1636);
• North Korea (Res. 1718 and subsequent resolutions);
• Iran (Res. 1737 and subsequent resolutions);
• Somalia and Eritrea (Res. 1916 and subsequent resolutions);
• Libya (Res. 1970 and subsequent resolutions);
• Central African Republic (Res. 2127 and subsequent resolutions);
• Yemen (Res. 2140 and subsequent resolutions);
• South Sudan (Res. 2206); 
• Al-Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and designated 
associates (Resolutions 1267/1989 and subsequent resolutions); and 
• The Taliban and designated associates (Res. 1988 and subsequent resolutions). 
(Under the respective sanctions regime, associates of ISIL and al-Qaeda and of the Taliban 
can include both individuals and organizations.) 
With respect to each sanctions regime, member states are required to, among other things, 
ensure that “their nationals or any persons within their territories” do not make available “any 
funds, financial assets or economic resources” to or for the benefit of certain individuals and 
entities enumerated by the relevant Security Council body. The al-Qaeda sanctions regime 
goes further than most in elaborating on the meaning of this restriction. For instance, UNSCR 
2161 (2014) provides that “costs incurred with respect to transportation and lodging” count 
as proscribed economic resources concerning al-Qaeda and its associates.
The Security Council has crafted these obligations so broadly as to potentially implicate 
some activities of individuals and organizations engaged in principled humanitarian 
action. Since humanitarian organizations’ members and leadership will typically qualify as 
nationals or persons within the territory of some state, the asset freeze could be applied 
5Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions April 2016
6Understanding Humanitarian Exemptions April 2016
in relation to them. Under a literal reading of the Security Council decision, the fees, tolls, 
and taxes that a humanitarian organization may deem it necessary to pay in order to 
access civilians in need of assistance would qualify as “funds, financial assets or economic 
resources.” In that case, if the authority to whom the humanitarian organization pays the 
fees is subject to the sanctions, then the humanitarian organization would be susceptible 
to punishment or other consequences under the domestic measures implemented to carry 
out the UN sanctions regime. At least in relation to al-Qaeda, covering the cost of travel of 
an individual on the sanctions list—for example, in order to facilitate negotiations aimed at 
accessing civilian beneficiaries—would contravene the UN sanctions. Organizations relying 
on government donors might face additional related challenges: many major humanitarian 
government donors insert into their grant agreements a requirement of compliance with 
Security Council resolutions.3 
In relation to most sanctions regimes (though not all, as will be addressed below), the 
relevant Security Council decisions do not expressly exclude humanitarian actors from 
the reach of the economic proscriptions. The lack of an explicit exclusion means that the 
domestic measures implementing those sanctions regimes may implicate the conduct of 
those humanitarian actors.
Security Council-mandated sanctions regimes also commonly include arms embargos and 
travel bans. Yet, in certain respects, those regimes seem to permit some types of activities 
involved in humanitarian response or, at least, may be interpreted as minimizing a sanc-
tion-induced “chilling effect” on humanitarian organizations. For example, some of those 
sanctions regimes exempt from the arms embargos non-lethal military equipment and 
protective clothing so long as the equipment and clothing are intended solely for human-
itarian use.4 Moreover, while asset-freeze provisions generally require states to prevent 
their nationals and persons within their territory from violating the asset freeze, travel-ban 
provisions do not; the latter require that states “take the necessary measures” to prevent 
sanctioned individuals from entering their territory. This difference allows states some 
discretion in crafting their travel bans. Thus, states’ efforts to prevent travel do not need 
to involve penalizing a humanitarian actor who extends an invitation to a negotiation 
session to a sanctioned individual. Instead, the state could, for example, take administra-
3.  See, e.g., Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Engagement Project, An Analysis of Contemporary Coun-
terterrorism-related Clauses in Humanitarian Grant and Partnership Agreement Contracts, Research and 
Policy Paper 22 (2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/cheproject/files/2013/10/CHE_Project_-_Counterterror-
ism-related_Humanitarian_Grant_Clauses_May_2014.pdf.
4.  See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 para. 6 (2000); U.N. Security Council Resolution 1493 para. 
21 (2003).
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tive measures to prohibit the individual’s entry and penalize the individual if he or she 
attempts to circumvent those measures. However, in the course of implementing these 
travel bans domestically, states could interpret the UN requirements broadly and prohibit 
actors from facilitating the travel of sanctioned actors. States could insert provisions into 
grant agreements, for example, requiring humanitarian actors not to facilitate such travel. 
Finally, even if the humanitarian organization itself did not risk punishment or loss of 
donations through facilitating travel arrangements, travel bans could inhibit the organiza-
tion’s ability to engage in mediation, negotiation, or training that requires the sanctioned 
party to travel.
In what other ways might principled humanitarian action be restricted by 
sanctions regimes?
Many states’ domestic laws criminalize the provision of material support of terrorism, 
though the terminology might differ. In addition to the previously mentioned cases of 
paying taxes, registration fees, or checkpoint fees—which could potentially violate mate-
rial-support laws if the authority to which the fee was paid was a proscribed terrorist 
organization or an affiliate of one—other activities of humanitarian organizations might 
violate these counterterrorism laws. An International Committee of the Red Cross report 
suggested that those activities might include: 
visits and material assistance to detainees suspected of or condemned for being 
members of a terrorist organization; facilitation of family visits to such detainees; 
first aid training; war surgery seminars; IHL dissemination to members of armed 
opposition groups included in terrorist lists; assistance to provide for the basic 
needs of the civilian population in areas controlled by armed groups associated 
with terrorism; and largescale assistance activities to internally displaced persons, 
where individuals associated with terrorism may be among the beneficiaries.5 
What is a humanitarian exemption?
The term “humanitarian exemption” is not a term of art, and it might relate to at least two 
different concepts. 
First, “humanitarian exemption” is sometimes used to describe exemptions for individuals—
especially “bad actors” who, due to their designation, may need an exemption to obtain 
life-saving goods or services. In other words, these are “exemptions designed to allow…
5.  InternatIonal CommIttee of the red Cross, InternatIonal humanItarIan law and the Challenges of ContemPorary 
armed ConflICts 52 (2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-interna-
tional-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf.
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individuals [on UN sanctions lists] to receive assistance on a case by case basis in response 
to specific humanitarian needs.”6 For example, a sanctioned individual might be permitted 
to travel to another country in order to receive medical assistance or to participate in peace 
negotiations. He or she might be given access to his or her funds in order to pay for legal 
assistance.
Second, a different type of so-called “humanitarian exemption,” and the focus of this 
briefing memorandum, is an exemption for humanitarian organizations and their actors—
in other words, for the “good actors” who constitute the sector of principled humanitarian 
actors. This sectoral type of humanitarian exemption carves out a space in sanctions and 
counterterrorism regimes for forms of principled humanitarian action, allowing humani-
tarian actors to deliver their services without the risk of contravening those regimes. For 
example, this sectoral type of humanitarian exemption could specify that, if a principled 
humanitarian actor engaged in a certain course of conduct and took particular precautions 
in doing so, the person would not have violated the relevant UN sanctions regime.
Thus humanitarian exemptions for individuals and for the principled humanitarian sector 
are different. Most basically, individual exemptions are directed towards individuals whom 
the relevant Security Council body has designated. Sectoral exemptions are designed to 
help good-faith humanitarian actors avoid punishment for activities within the scope of 
their mission. Also, the relevant UN Sanctions Committee grants a humanitarian exemption 
for an individual typically in response to a specific need that has arisen—that is, on a case-
by-case basis. Though sectoral humanitarian exemptions could also be granted on such a 
case-by-case basis (for example, to a specific organization), another option is a standing 
sectoral exemption. The main benefit of such a standing exemption is that it would provide 
advance approval for humanitarian action, without the organization and individual human-
itarian actors needing to seek authorization before each intervention.
What is the debate surrounding sectoral humanitarian exemptions?
Proponents of sectoral humanitarian exemptions believe that such exemptions are 
necessary in order to provide legal clarity to help facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. By definition, principled humanitarian actors want to ensure that aid goes to 
needy individuals. Those actors have therefore developed internal policies and procedures 
to help prevent or at least mitigate diversion of assistance. Further, proponents generally 
believe that even in the event that some money does go to sanctioned or otherwise 
6.  High Level Review of United Nations Sanctions, UN Sanctions: Humanitarian Aspects and Emerging 
Challenges – Working Group 3 Chairperson’s Report 5 (2015), http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org/HLR_WG3_
report_final.19.1.15.pdf.
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proscribed individuals and entities, it will be minimal when seen within the broader context 
and will be offset by the alleviation of human suffering the humanitarian organizations will 
offer. Proponents have also argued that the sectoral humanitarian exemptions that do exist 
are too limited in scope; are too ad hoc in nature; and are insufficiently clear.
Objections to sectoral humanitarian exemptions fall along two main lines. First, some critics 
fear that exemptions will ultimately limit humanitarian action. The underlying concern 
is that the creation of explicit humanitarian exemptions will imply that exemptions are 
always necessary. Under that logic, the absence of an explicit exemption would mean that 
no (other) sufficient authorization already exists. According to this line of thinking, if past 
sanction regimes are not revised or addressed by future sectoral humanitarian exemptions 
or if sectoral humanitarian exemptions are difficult to negotiate in certain situations, 
humanitarian organizations could end up feeling more restricted. Thus interpreting silence 
as the lack of authorization, principled humanitarian organizations may ultimately decide 
not to act, resulting in fewer people in need receiving assistance from those organizations. 
Additionally, critics argue that requesting exemptions will suggest that existing provisions 
and rules of IHL as well as commitments to humanitarian action by the United Nations and 
donor states are not currently strong enough to fully support humanitarianism. Further, 
some humanitarian actors have expressed the concern that an exemption would be seen 
as an endorsement of them by the exempting state or body. Such an endorsement, under 
this reasoning, would risk tarnishing the humanitarian actors’ reputation for neutrality and 
independence. Since its reputation is one of the main currencies of a principled humani-
tarian organization, being perceived as non-principled in these ways may ultimately inhibit 
the organization’s access to people in need.
Second, some opponents object to humanitarian exemptions on the grounds of state 
security. They argue that exemptions could be used as a loophole to enable people 
masquerading as principled humanitarian actors to funnel financial support to sanctioned 
individuals and entities. Moreover, this line of argument holds that, if humanitarian actors 
are permitted to provide assistance to a particular location, terrorists themselves might 
even pretend to be humanitarian actors as a cover for their terrorist activities. Finally, there 
is a concern in this connection that sectoral humanitarian exemptions will be interpreted 
as permission to engage in bribery, thus expanding the degree to which bribes are paid. 
What models of sectoral humanitarian exemptions exist?
Sectoral humanitarian exemptions can, in principle, vary widely in what they cover in terms 
of their in geographic, material, personal, and temporal scope. For example, the exemption 
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might apply only in relation to situations of armed conflict. An exemption could be limited 
to covering only certain humanitarian activities or covering activities that take place only 
in certain territories. Additionally, an exemption might apply only to certain actors, such 
as UN agencies (as is the case with the Somalia exemption discussed below), or only for a 
certain time frame (as was initially the case for the Somalia exemption). Beyond matters of 
scope, there are different options for the creation and the form of sectoral humanitarian 
exemptions.
International Models
So far, UN Security Council practice has demonstrated one form of (partial) sectoral human-
itarian exemptions: the decision-specific exemption. The most discussed example applies 
to Somalia and Eritrea and was established in UNSCR 1916 (2010). Though the exemption 
was initially limited to one year, the Security Council has renewed it each time the issue 
has arisen.7 The exemption establishes that “the payment of funds, other financial assets or 
economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humani-
tarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, 
humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General 
Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, or their implementing partners” will not 
result in an asset freeze.8 On its terms, this exemption does not cover all humanitarian 
organizations.
Another decision-specific example, albeit one addressed to states, comes from UNSCR 2009 
(2011), which pertains to the Libya sanctions. Under this decision, the asset freeze does not 
apply to economic resources connected with the Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Arab 
Foreign Bank, the Libyan Investment Authority, and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio 
if the acting state’s intent is to direct one of those entities towards certain purposes. Those 
purposes include “humanitarian needs,” “fuel, electricity and water for strictly civilian uses,” 
and “establishing, operating, or strengthening institutions of civilian government and 
civilian public infrastructure.”9
Any model that relies on a Security Council decision could face some difficulties, as it 
would likely require domestic codification (or the equivalent, depending on the jurisdic-
tion) in order to be effective. (As an example, Security Council decisions have mandated 
that states establish certain terrorist acts as serious criminal offenses in domestic laws and 
7.  UN Security Council Resolutions 1972 (2011), 2060 (2012), 2111 (2013), 2182 (2014), 2244 (2015).
8.  UN Security Council Resolution 1916 para. 5 (2010).
9.  UN Security Council Resolution 2009 para. 16 (2011).
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regulations,10 sometimes with success.11) Further, Security Council action in this area could 
be conceptualized as a way to help ensure states fulfill a preexisting obligation, where 
applicable, to permit certain forms of humanitarian assistance.12 Nevertheless, although 
legally obliged to carry out decisions of the Security Council, in practice sometimes a state 
does not expressly incorporate the obligations entailed in those decisions into its domestic 
law. For example, the United States has not incorporated the humanitarian exemption 
imposed by the Security Council in UNSCR 1916 (2010) into U.S. domestic laws and regu-
lations.13 Without sufficient national-level guarantees, humanitarian actors are not fully 
legally protected.
Domestic Models
Even absent a Security Council mandate to do so, a state could on its own initiative 
promulgate a sectoral humanitarian exemption into domestic laws and regulations. In the 
United States, certain such exemptions arguably exist—though they are limited in scope 
and do not establish a general sectoral humanitarian exemption, including from counter-
terrorism laws and regulations. In parallel with the existing Security Council exemptions 
that apply only in relation to the decisions that contain them, U.S. sectoral humanitarian 
exemptions take the form of provisions within specific laws that apply only to those 
specific laws. Moreover, those U.S. sectoral humanitarian exemptions are also subject 
to further limitations. The U.S. material-support law, in addition to exempting “medicine 
[and] religious materials,”14 includes a requirement that support be provided “knowingly” 
to a proscribed organization (either a designated terrorist organization or an organization 
that “has engaged or engages in terrorist activity”) in order to violate the statute.15 That 
knowledge element could conceivably protect humanitarian actors who unknowingly 
provide prohibited resources to such organizations. However, it bears emphasis that the 
Supreme Court has affirmed that whether a person intends to support terrorist activities 
is irrelevant.16 
10.  See, e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1373 para. 2(e) (2001).
11.  See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Emergency after 9/11, 6 InsIghts on l. & soC’y 1, 3–4 (2006) 
(describing how Mexico and Venezuela dropped their initial domestic legal objections to a UNSC-mandated 
counterterrorism policy).
12.  See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 23 (for 
international armed conflicts).
13.  See Kate Mackintosh, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Implications for Humanitarian Action: A View 
from Médecins Sans Frontières, 34 suffolk transnat’l l.r. 507, 514 (2011); 80 Fed. Reg. 191932015.
14.  18 U.S.C § 2339A (2009).
15.  18 U.S.C § 2339B (2015).
16.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2010).
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In addition, the U.S. material-support statute allows for the Secretary of State, in 
concurrence with the Attorney General, to approve the provision of “personnel,” “training,” 
and “expert advice and assistance” that might otherwise qualify as material support.17 Yet 
the protection offered by the Secretary of State-approved exemption is also limited. It 
cannot apply to “the provision of any material support that may be used to carry out 
terrorist activity,”18 as defined in another statute.19 Further, some humanitarian actors 
have objected to the Secretary of State-approved exemption’s case-by-case nature on 
three grounds. First, it may prevent prompt responses in emergency situations. Second, 
it provides no guiding criteria for when applications for exemption should be approved. 
And third, due to its exclusion of food, water, and medical aid (other than medicine itself, 
which is already exempted under the statute), the Secretary of State-approved exemption 
is too narrow. This U.S. law thus does not contain the sort of exemption envisioned by 
proponents of a sectoral humanitarian exemption.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is another U.S. law that 
authorizes the President to freeze assets—in this case in connection with individuals or 
groups listed by the President or the Department of the Treasury as “specially designated 
global terrorists.” IEEPA establishes an exemption for “donations…of articles, such as food, 
clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering.”20 This exemption is 
subject to the qualification that the President is authorized to freeze even those donations 
if they would “seriously impair” his or her ability to respond to the emergency, are a result of 
coercion, or would endanger U.S. military forces engaged in hostilities.21 In practice, since 
the issuance in 2001 of Executive Order 13224, the President has repeatedly instituted such 
freezes in executive orders related to armed groups or terrorism.22
Australia has adopted a similar model of including within a relevant law that might 
(otherwise) restrict principled humanitarian action a sectoral humanitarian exemption to 
that law. Under that Australian exemption, a person will not be found to have impermis-
sibly associated with a terrorist organization, or committed one of certain other criminal 
violations, if he or she “engages in conduct solely by way of, or for the purposes of, the 
provision of aid of a humanitarian nature.”23
17.  Id.
18.  18 U.S.C § 2339B (2015)
19.  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2013).
20.  50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2001).
21.  Id.
22.  See Antonio Galli, The U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act: Maintaining Humanitarian Space in 
U.S. Legislation, 5 J. Int’l humanItarIan legal stud. 130, 133 (2014).
23.  See, e.g., Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995 s. 102.8 (Austl.).
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Besides a statute that contains an exemption with respect to its own provisions, another 
potential model for domestic exemptions is the issuing of agency rules and guidance or 
individual exemptions, irrespective of whether a statute requires that exemption. The U.S. 
Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has taken one step in this 
direction by amending its regulations on Sudanese and Iranian sanctions to issue general 
licenses that authorize the exportation of food or medicine (or both) to certain areas.24 In 
an attempt to help alleviate some NGOs’ concerns, OFAC has also issued policy guidance 
to NGOs providing humanitarian assistance by recognizing that in “a dangerous and 
highly unstable environment combined with urgent humanitarian need…some humani-
tarian assistance may unwittingly end up in the hands of members of a designated group. 
Such incidental benefits are not a focus for OFAC sanctions enforcement.”25 However, this 
guidance does not have the force of law.
Could a humanitarian exemption be broader-based and more long-lasting 
than the models implemented thus far?
In addition to exemptions contained within sanction-creating laws or resolutions and 
exemptions created through administrative action, states and intergovernmental organi-
zations, such as the United Nations, could consider another option: a standing, all-purpose, 
sector-wide humanitarian exemption. If implemented through domestic action, such an 
exemption would likely need to be a law (at least for the purpose of U.S. jurisdiction). In the 
United Nations, such an exemption may be established, for example, as a decision forming 
part of an omnibus Security Council resolution. As conceptualized by the proponents of 
such a measure, an omnibus resolution would need to extend the exemption so that it 
encompasses all relevant humanitarian actors and thus not only UN actors and their imple-
menting partners, which is one of the limitations currently entailed in the Somalia and 
Eritrea humanitarian exemption. Moreover, according to its proponents, such an omnibus 
resolution would need to apply the exemption without geographic restrictions. In order 
to be practical and politically feasible, though, the resolution would likely also have to 
address some of the previously mentioned concerns, including that an insufficiently 
tailored exemption may risk facilitating bribery or support for terrorism.
Proposed U.S. legislation, the Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding Protection Act, sits 
between an omnibus exemption and an exemption to a statute contained in that statute: it 
would amend the material-support law and IEEPA to allow communication with sanctioned 
24.  31 C.F.R. 538, 560 (2015).
25.  U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Guidance Related to the Provision 
of Humanitarian Assistance by Not-for-Profit Non-Governmental Organizations (2014), http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/ngo_humanitarian.pdf.
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individuals in order “to prevent or alleviate the suffering of a civilian population” and would 
prevent the President from “restrict[ing]…transactions with [sanctioned] person[s] that are 
customary, necessary, and incidental to the donation or provision of goods or services…
to prevent or alleviate the suffering of civilian populations,”26 if the humanitarian actors 
perform due diligence. However, this bill has not been introduced to Congress.
What elements can be built into an exemption to help ensure it is not abused?
As mentioned above, there are two main types of concerns about sectoral humanitarian 
exemptions. First, they might function in ways that would actually restrict humanitarian 
action. And second, they might exacerbate preexisting or create new security risks for states. 
In terms of the first concern (restricting humanitarian action), proponents of the earli-
er-mentioned models would want to avoid the possibility that the creation of additional or 
broader exemptions could be used as a pretext to deny humanitarian action in situations 
where there were no exemptions. This concern might be partially addressed by including 
in any new exemption a reference to the exemption’s existence not prejudicing human-
itarian access and assistance in situations without a clear exemption. That tactic would 
not necessarily resolve the issue entirely, though. Over time, controlling politically based 
decisions might not be possible. Further, if in practice many states began to adopt more 
sectoral humanitarian exemptions without sufficient safeguards, an argument might be 
put forward that a customary international law norm requiring an exemption to authorize 
humanitarian action was beginning to emerge.
To help address the other main concern (security risks), exemption proponents would likely 
need to craft mechanisms to protect a sectoral humanitarian exemption from being abused 
for the purpose of supporting terrorism. Doing so would likely be particularly important 
for an omnibus sectoral humanitarian exemption. Still, in order for an exemption to be 
useful, it would need to be crafted in a way that does not impose unworkable measures on 
humanitarian actors. Additionally, some humanitarian actors might object to any process 
that they believed would create the perception that they are constrained by or aligned 
with a particular state or a specific regional or multilateral body.
Some of the existing exemptions provide illustrations of forms of protective mechanisms 
that could be used to help ameliorate such concerns. For example, UNSCR 1916 (2010) 
required the United Nations Humanitarian Aid Coordinator for Somalia to report on the 
implementation of the decision’s exemption to the Security Council every 120 days, 
26.  Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding Protection Act (2015), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/
system/files/files/2015HAPPA-May29%202015(1).pdf.
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including humanitarian organizations’ requests and “any impediments to the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance in Somalia.”27 The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is currently 
responsible for these reports, which the most recent Security Council decisions have 
requested on an annual basis.28 According to the ERC’s reports, UN agencies in Somalia 
have adopted risk-mitigation measures such as external audits of NGO-funded projects 
(including field visits); a minimum standard for the collection of partner information;29 and 
the creation of a Risk Management Unit,30 which operates according to the International 
Organization for Standardization’s 31000 standards.31 The Unit has been bolstered over time 
through the establishment of a Risk Management Team in Mogadishu and the inclusion of 
an Investigations Liaison Officer from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services.32 The 
Unit provides risk-management advice and training and offers risk assessments to existing 
or potential partners. It also manages and analyzes a database containing contractor 
information (which it updates as new entities are sanctioned by the Security Council or 
otherwise flagged by the World Bank, the International Criminal Police Organization, and 
the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group). The Unit does not plan to confine its activities 
solely to UN organizations and staff. It intends to roll out its introduction to risk management 
course to the wider NGO community and already offers advice to several NGOs on their due 
diligence measures.33
In keeping with broader UN humanitarian policies, the ERC indicated in the most recent 
report that he expects that country-based pooled funds (in which multiple donors combine 
27.  UNSCR 1916, supra note 8, at para. 11.
28.  See UNSC 2244, supra note 7, at para. 24; UNSCR 2182, supra note 7, at para. 42.
29.  See Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907, Letter dated 
Sep. 18, 2015 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907 to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/731 (Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/731.
30.  See, e.g., Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907, Letter dated 
Nov. 9, 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to 751 & 1907 to the President of 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2011/694 (Nov. 10, 2011), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N11/583/54/PDF/N1158354.pdf?OpenElement.
31.  See Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907, Letter dated 
March 10, 2014 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907 to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/177 (March 14, 2014), http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/177.
32.  See Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907, Letter dated 
Nov. 19, 2012 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 & 1907 to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2012/856 (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/856.
33.  See Chairman, supra note 29.
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their funds targeted at a specific country and the ERC manages the combined amount34) will 
be useful in preventing diversion due to its risk-management framework.35 This framework 
includes “risk-based grant management,” which involves assessing the capacity of potential 
NGO partners (and updating those assessments over time to include performance). Then, 
the type of implementing partner (for example, a UN agency or an NGO), the partner’s risk 
level if it is an NGO, and the project’s duration and value affect the use of some combination 
of the following “assurance mechanisms”: the number and percentage of disbursements, 
a funding ceiling, field monitoring visits, financial spot checks, narrative and financial 
reporting requirements, and a partner audit.36 Partners are also expected to have their own 
internal monitoring mechanisms.
Whether separate from or alongside the above-mentioned risk-management frameworks, 
another potential modality to help prevent an exemption from being used to support 
terrorism would be to adopt due diligence measures. First, the appropriate due diligence 
requirements would need to be devised. One model is the UN’s human rights due diligence 
policy. This policy lays out steps UN entities must take before providing support to non-UN 
security forces.37 The U.N. entity must perform a risk assessment that includes certain 
factors; develop an implementation framework that includes monitoring mechanisms; 
and report on these efforts and challenges. The policy itself could likely not be imported 
unaltered into the humanitarian exemption context, however: different criteria would need 
to be considered. And, if the exemption went beyond UN actors, it is not clear that those 
other actors would always have the capacity and authorization to perform a similar level of 
oversight. However, elements of this model could conceivably be adapted to create a due 
diligence policy for humanitarian action. Another option would be to adapt the Financial 
Action Task Force’s due diligence recommendations for states38 to a streamlined list that is 
relevant to those individuals and organizations seeking to engage in principled humani-
tarian action.
After the appropriate due diligence requirements were selected, the consequences of due 
diligence would need to be decided. In other legal regimes, the effect of performing due 
34.  Country-Based Pooled Funds, unIted natIons offICe for the CoordInatIon of humanItarIan affaIrs, http://www.
unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-funds (last accessed March 1, 2016).
35.  See Chairman, supra note 29.
36.  unIted natIons offICe for the CoordInatIon of humanItarIan affaIrs, oPeratIon handbook for Country-based Pooled 
funds 22-35 (2015), https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/globalerfguidelines.pdf.
37.  U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 25, 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President 
of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/67/775 (March 5, 2013).
38.  See fInanCIal aCtIon task forCe, the fatf reCommendatIons: InternatIonal standards on CombattIng money 
launderIng and the fInanCIng of terrorIsm & ProlIferatIon (2012).
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diligence varies. For example, U.S. authorities may be merely disinclined to take action 
against “voluntarily disclosed and remediated conduct” that violates the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act,39 while the U.S. Securities Act absolves liability for non-issuers involved with 
securities with false registration statements if the non-issuer “had no reasonable ground 
to believe and did not believe” the registration was false.40 The entity creating the sectoral 
humanitarian exemption would need to choose the level of protection that due diligence 
would afford, keeping in mind the balance between the safety from misdirected funds 
offered by high regulation and the need to avoid an overly onerous burden that limits 
access to aid more than is necessary and feasible. Still, requiring humanitarian actors 
to perform due diligence in order to qualify for an exemption would be one option to 
minimize the likelihood that organizations would deliberately fund acts of terrorism or 
would be perceived as having a free pass to engage in unconsidered bribery.
39.  u.s. dePartment of JustICe & seCurItIes & exChange CommIssIon, a resourCe guIde to the foreIgn CorruPt PraCtICes 
aCt 28 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
40.  Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1998).
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